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1  Introduction
The economic integration underlying globalisation has had a profound 
effect on the mobility and movement of labour across national boundaries. 
Apart from the peripatetic nature of certain professions many employees – 
because of an enterprise’s desire to rotate staff or to assign staff to specific 
projects or affiliates in foreign countries – perform their duties across national 
boundaries. The phenomenon of transnational employment raises unique 
legal challenges and may ultimately require visionary solutions based on 
harmonisation of laws through convention and perhaps protection through 
transnational collective bargaining. These processes, however, are slow and 
often cannot be expected to do more than provide baseline protection for 
employees. This simply means that most international employment disputes 
arise (and will continue to do so) at the micro level when individuals challenge 
an employer’s conduct in a specific country’s courts or tribunals with reliance 
on a specific country’s labour laws.
Two factors combine to serve as harbingers of the sometimes complex issues 
that arise in these cases and also to delineate the focus of this article. First, 
the immediate challenge arises when an individual litigant institutes action 
in a country and typically relies on the labour laws of the same country that 
do not readily or apparently have a dominant international connection with 
the dispute. A good recent example is to be found in Simpson v Intralinks1 
(“Simpson”), where the claimant lived and worked in Germany, her contract 
of employment contained an express choice of jurisdiction (Frankfurt) and 
choice of law (German), yet she brought action against her employer (with 
its registered office in London) under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and 
Equal Pay Act 1970 in the Employment Tribunal in the UK. Whether this 
*  We would like to thank the two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions
1 UKEAT/0593/11/RN
       
happens for reasons of cost, convenience, reality,2 availability of remedies,3 or 
a combination of these factors does not matter for our present purposes. The 
fact remains that domestic tribunals and courts are called on to answer difficult 
questions relating to jurisdiction and the law applicable to transnational 
employment disputes.4
Second, while contractual principles continue to be significant in the 
regulation of the employment relationship, domestic labour legislation 
nowadays provides the bulk of protection and the rights most often relied 
on in practice by litigants. In particular, domestic labour legislation will 
typically extend “fair” terms and conditions of employment. At a first level, 
this happens directly through minimum standards legislation, which often 
has overriding effect on contracts of employment, and indirectly through the 
promotion of collective bargaining and its prerequisite rights such as freedom 
of association. In addition, domestic labour legislation typically provides for 
protection against unfair dismissal and a prohibition against discrimination 
(including with respect to equal pay). Furthermore, many countries recognise 
the need to provide for simple, speedy and relatively cheap enforcement 
mechanisms in respect of these legislative rights – often through specialist 
tribunals created by legislation with statutorily circumscribed jurisdiction 
regarding the types of disputes they may hear and determine.5 On top of this, 
domestic legislation is often silent on the issue of extraterritorial application. 
At the same time, discrepancies remain in the levels of protection offered by 
labour legislation of different countries, and it is also reasonable to assume 
that levels of sophistication in the often specialist institutional application of 
labour legislation also differ between countries.
Against this background, the focus of this article is specific – to consider, 
on a comparative basis, the application of domestic labour legislation in 
international employment disputes. In part 2 below, the problem and its 
possible solution will be described, for the purposes of the discussion, 
as a basic choice between two currently competing approaches: a private 
international law approach (conflict of laws6 approach, with the application of 
legislation seen as incidental to the applicable or proper law) and a more direct 
interpretive approach (where the application of legislation in international 
employment disputes is seen purely as a matter of statutory interpretation). 
Then in part 3 we shall provide a comparative overview of the approaches 
and experiences in the UK (in the context of the European Union (“EU”)), 
South Africa, New Zealand and the USA. While the choice of these countries 
is hardly exhaustive, consideration of their approaches does provide examples 
2 Where, for example, the other available option would be to approach the courts of a country relatively 
undeveloped in comparison to the forum of a litigant’s choice
3 Where, for example, the labour laws of other possible forums do not provide the same level of protection
4 Of course, matters may become even more complicated if the applicable law is foreign: the content of 
foreign law is a matter of fact – evidence and proof – before the court which accepted jurisdiction  This 
may be no easy matter and often beyond the capacity of litigants and representatives  
5 Examples of such tribunals are the Employment Tribunals in the United Kingdom and the Commission 
for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration in South Africa
6 See Parry v Astral Operations Ltd 2005 26 ILJ 1479 (LC) for an exposition of different terms used in this 
context  
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of the different possible ways the problem has been and may be approached. 
Part 4 will consider lessons to be learnt and part 5 will offer recommendations 
and a conclusion.
2  The problem in more detail: a choice between two 
approaches
If we take our cue from the insightful analysis provided by Grušić,7 there 
are two fundamental ways of approaching the application of legislation in 
international employment disputes.
The first of these approaches – what may be termed a private international 
law8 approach – is to see the application of legislation as incidental to the 
proper law of contract which, in the first instance, remains determinative 
of which country’s laws apply to a dispute. This well-known approach 
to transnational employment disputes means we should follow the usual 
sequence of determining, first, the court which would have jurisdiction.9 
This is then followed by the identification and application of the applicable 
or proper law (in the absence of a choice of the applicable legal system by 
parties) utilising some test of “close, sufficient or dominant connection” 
between the relationship at issue and the legal systems of different possible 
countries that might apply.10 This enquiry will typically entail an analysis 
of all the different factors relating to the particular employment relationship 
and consideration thereof as indicative of the proper system of law to apply 
to the dispute. What is important for present purposes is that in this process 
legislation is essentially seen to apply in two circumstances. First, where 
the proper law of the contract is the (domestic) law of the forum, application 
of domestic legislation follows as a matter of course.11 Second, where the 
proper law of the contract is found to be foreign (also when parties have 
chosen a foreign system as the applicable law), domestic legislation may have 
overriding (mandatory) effect.12 One immediate difficulty with this approach 
relates to the relationship between the contract of employment and often free-
standing legislative employment rights. In other words, is it appropriate that 
the application of domestic labour legislation (of the forum), which may not 
be dependent on the existence of an employment contract and/or may not have 
an actual effect on the contract, be dependent on rules applicable to contracts? 
This relationship between contract and legislation will be considered in what 
follows.
The second approach is one that may be described as an “interpretive” 
approach. In terms of this approach, reliance on domestic labour legislation 
7 U Grušić “The Territorial Scope of Employment Legislation and Employment Law” (2012) 75 MLR 
722-751
8 This term is preferred by C Forsyth Private International Law 5 ed (2012) 5-6
9 See a full discussion of the method of the steps to be followed to establish the proper law in K Calitz 
“The Jurisdiction of the Labour Court in International Employment Contracts in Respect of Workplaces 
outside South Africa” (2011) 32 Obiter 678 679; L Merrett “The Extraterritorial Reach of Employment 
Legislation” (2010) 39 Industrial LJ 355
10 L Collins (ed) Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws 2 15 ed (2012) paras 32-006–32-008  
11 Subject, of course, to the content and requirements contained in that legislation
12 Again subject to the reservation expressed in the previous footnote  
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in international employment disputes is simply seen by courts and tribunals 
as a matter of interpretation of the legislation to determine its application 
to the international relationship in question (often termed “extraterritorial” 
application). At this stage four remarks may be made about the interpretive 
approach to set the scene for the further discussion. First, if one juxtaposes 
the interpretation of legislative rights enforced by specialist tribunals (which 
have limited jurisdiction) with a private international law approach described 
earlier, it would seem as if the interpretive approach pre-empts the private 
international law approach. As Lord Hoffman said in the Lawson v Serco13 
(“Serco”) trilogy with reference to the international application of section 94 
of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”) (UK):
“[W]hat connection between Great Britain and the employment relationship is required to make 
section 94(1) the appropriate choice of law in deciding whether and in what circumstances an 
employee can complain that his dismissal was unfair? The answer to this question will also determine 
the question of jurisdiction, since the Employment Tribunal will have jurisdiction to decide upon the 
unfairness of the dismissal if (but only if) section 94(1) is the appropriate choice of law.”14
Second, it needs to be borne in mind that when one speaks of an interpretive 
approach, such interpretation may take place in two contexts: legislation may 
expressly provide for and circumscribe its international application,15 or (as is 
often the case) the legislation may be silent.16 Third, as mentioned and to the 
extent that courts follow the interpretive approach where legislation is silent, 
the interpretive process often is described as an enquiry into the extraterritorial 
application of that legislation. This could be seen as a misnomer and creates 
the risk that we place geography above substance. The question simply is (and 
should be) whether legislation applies to an employment relationship with 
international characteristics. Fourth, the comparative survey below will show 
that the interpretive approach seems to dominate. This domination does not, 
of course, mean that the interpretive approach is correct, let alone good. At 
least in respect of the UK it will be seen that this approach has been subjected 
to strong criticism, while the South African experience arguably does no more 
than graphically illustrate the dangers inherent in such an approach. This 
means that the comparative survey, to which we shall now turn our attention, 
should be seen, for now, as a mere description of different approaches and 
existing criticism of them.
13 [2006] UKHL 3; [2006] 1 All ER 823
14 Para 1  Note that Lord Hoffman here deliberately put the question in the traditional terms of the conflict of 
laws  For “appropriate choice of law” used in the quotation one can, in light of the rest of the judgment and 
for purposes of this article, simply read “applicable legislation”  Also in Lawson v Serco [2006] UKHL 
3; [2006] 1 All ER 823 (para 38), and with reference to Financial Times Ltd v Bishop [2003] UKEAT 
0147, Lord Hoffman made it clear that the assumption of jurisdiction is subject to the scope of domestic 
legislation: “the Regulation assumes that the employee has a claim to enforce, whereas the question was 
whether section 94(1) gave Mr Bishop a substantive claim”  Note, however, the different approach in 
Simpson v Intralinks UKEAT/0593/11/RN described below
15 As in the case of US federal discrimination legislation (discussed below)
16 As in the case of the UK, RSA and New Zealand, which will be discussed below
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3  Comparative overview
3 1  Great Britain in the eu context
3 1 1  The EU context
Convention 80/934/ECC on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 
1980 (“the Rome Convention”) was converted into a community instrument 
by the Rome 1 Regulation in 2008.17 These instruments harmonise the rules 
of conflict of laws of the members of the European Union. They deal with the 
applicable (proper) law of international contracts and prescribe special rules 
for contracts where one of the parties is regarded as weaker than the other.
The position regarding employment contracts is regulated in articles 6 and 7 
of the Rome Convention (applicable to employment contracts concluded until 
17 December 2009) and articles 8 and 9 of the Rome I Regulation (applicable 
to employment contracts concluded after 17 December 2009).18 The Rome 
Convention provides19 that parties have freedom of choice of applicable law, 
except in the case of mandatory legislation of the jurisdiction that would have 
applied in the absence of choice.20 If parties did not choose a legal system, the 
law of the country where the employee habitually carries out his work will be 
applicable.21 If it is not possible to establish where the employee habitually 
carries out his work, the law of the country in which the place of business 
through which he was engaged is situated will be applicable.22 Despite these 
rules, if it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is 
more closely connected with another country, the contract shall be governed 
17 Regulation (EC) No 593/ 2008 of 17 June 2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (“Rome 
I Regulation”)
18 The Rome I Regulation superseded the Rome Convention on 17 December 2009 in relation to all contracts 
concluded after this date (see arts 28 and 29(2))
19 In the text the provisions of the Rome Convention are mentioned for the simple reason that most of the 
cases and disputes mentioned in this discussion were decided against that backdrop  The corresponding 
provisions in the Rome I Regulation read as follows:
“8(1)  An individual employment contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties in 
accordance with Article 3  Such a choice of law may not, however, have the result of depriving 
the employee of the protection afforded him by the provisions that cannot be derogated from 
by agreement under law that, in the absence of choice, would have been applicable pursuant to 
[Articles 8(2), 8(3) and 8(4)]
8(2)  To the extent that the law applicable to the individual employment contract has not been chosen 
by the parties, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country in which or, failing that, 
from which the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract  The 
country where the work is habitually carried out shall not be deemed to have changed if he is 
temporarily employed in another country
8(3)  Where the law applicable cannot be determined [pursuant to paragraph 2], the contract shall be 
governed by the law of the country where the place of business through which the employee was 
engaged is situated
8(4)  Where it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected 
with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 2 or 3, the law of that other country shall 
apply ”
Art 9 provides for overriding application of mandatory provisions described as “provisions the respect 
for which is regarded as crucial by a country for safeguarding its public interests, such as its political, 
social or economic organization, to such an extent that they are applicable to any situation falling within 
their scope”
20 Art 6(1)  
21 Art 6(2)(a)
22 Art 6(2)(b)
542 STELL LR 2013 3
       
by the law of that country.23 The Convention provides for the application of 
mandatory rules of a country “with which the situation has a close connection, 
if and in so far as … those rules must be applied whatever the law applicable 
to the contract”.24 The application of these mandatory rules is made subject 
to discretion in light of “their nature and purpose” and “the consequences of 
their application or non-application”.25
Recent cases in which the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) was called 
upon to interpret article 6 of the Rome Convention dealt with employees 
carrying out their work in different countries and focused on the interpretation 
of article 6(2)(a) of the Rome Convention. In Heiko Koelsch v Etat du Grand 
Duchy of Luxemburg26 a German citizen was employed as an international 
truck driver with a specific contractual choice of law in favour of the law of 
Luxembourg. Koelsch challenged his dismissal on the basis that German law 
was applicable despite this choice. The court based its decision on a broad 
interpretation of article 6(2)(a) – namely that the applicable law is that of the 
country in which the employee performs most of his duties in light of all the 
factors which are characteristic of his activities.27 This interpretation means 
that courts would often not have to move on to interpret article 6(2)(b), which 
deals with the law of the country in which the place of business through which 
the employee was engaged is situated. This will only be the case when no 
country can be identified as the country in which the work habitually is carried 
out. In Jan Voogsgeerd v Navimer SA28 the employee worked as chief engineer 
on ships belonging to Navimer until his dismissal in 2002. The ECJ stated that 
in the light of the nature of the work in the maritime sector, the court must 
take all the characteristic factors of such employment into consideration.29 
If the place where he is actually employed, where he receives instructions 
and where he must report before discharging his duties is located in the same 
country, this is where he habitually carries out his duties in terms of article 
6(2)(a) of the Rome Convention.30
What these judgments show is the importance of the employee’s place of 
work for purposes of the application of labour law to international employment 
disputes in the European context. One reason for this is self-evident – the 
chosen wording of the Rome Convention which assigns pre-eminence to 
this enquiry. But for comparative purposes the argument goes further – the 
emphasis on the habitual place of work as determinative of applicable law 
is often said to be beneficial to the employee, who is the weaker party to the 
contract. The rationale behind this argument is that employees would be in a 
better position to bring claims if the law of the country where they work is 
the applicable law, as they would probably be more familiar with that legal 
23 Proviso to art 6(2)
24 Art 7(1)
25 Art 7
26 Case C-29/10 [2011] ECR I-0000  
27 Para 50
28 Case C-384/10 [2011] EUECJ I-000 (NYR)
29 Para 38
30 Paras 39-40
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system. Such a system of choice might achieve this aim in a legal environment 
that is relatively harmonious (such as the EU), but will surely not always 
adequately protect an employee who is transferred or assigned to, for example, 
a developing or underdeveloped country with lower labour standards where he 
habitually carries out his work. In European terms, such an employee might 
well be in a better position if the law of the place of business which engaged 
him is implemented (or, for that matter, the law of the country with the closest 
connection, if different to where he works), as this would most often be his 
home country. This part of article 6 will now seldom come into play in the 
light of the ECJ’s interpretation of article 6 and its hierarchical nature.
One other important aspect of the EU context relates to the status of 
mandatory labour legislation. As mentioned earlier, even if the private 
international law approach to the determination of applicable law is followed, 
mandatory legislation of the forum may have an overriding effect on the proper 
law. In the EU context, Grušić31 distinguishes between potential application 
of mandatory legislation in situations covered by the Posted Workers 
Directive32 and those falling outside the scope of the Directive. As far as the 
first-mentioned is concerned, Grušić points out that the Directive contains a 
list of core mandatory matters (which excludes unfair dismissal),33 as well 
as the possibility to apply “public policy provisions” in respect of non-listed 
matters.34 At the same time, Grušić mentions that the ECJ has held that the 
latter provision should be interpreted strictly and it is not for Member States 
to determine its content unilaterally through, for example, express statements 
in domestic legislation that it is mandatory.35 As far as situations falling 
outside the scope of the Posted Workers Directive are concerned, Grušić 
offers a number of reasons to doubt that domestic legislation may override 
applicable EU law.36 While this experience and these remarks are, again, EU 
specific, they are instructive: in a world where we are quick to state that labour 
legislation contains mandatory rights, they challenge us to consider whether 
and to what extent this really is the case for the purposes of application of 
legislation in international employment disputes. To take the matter a little 
further – again in the context of the UK and the EU – Grušić points out that 
a distinction may be made between legislation which aims at combating the 
misuse of managerial authority and at the balancing of individual interests 
(such as dismissal law, which then is non-mandatory), and legislation which is 
primarily aimed at the functioning of the labour market (such as working time, 
wages and anti-discrimination legislation, which may be seen as mandatory). 
Of course, depending on context, this distinction may be neither decisive nor 
all-encompassing, but it presents a good point of departure.
31 Grušić (2012) MLR 743-745  




35 Grušić (2012) MLR 743-744, with reference to Commission v Luxembourg Case C-319/06 [2008] ECR 
I-4232
36 Grušić (2012) MLR 744-747  
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3 1 2  Great Britain
The ERA is silent on whether the unfair dismissal protection of section 94(1) 
applies extraterritorially. In the Serco trilogy37 the House of Lords extended 
the extraterritorial application of this section to specific categories of British 
employees working outside Great Britain. The court ruled that in the absence 
of an explicit extension of legislation, the presumption against extraterritorial 
application may be rebutted, if it is established that the intention of Parliament 
was that the Act should apply to certain special categories of employees 
working outside Great Britain. This would be the case if there was a close 
connection between the employment and Great Britain. The court identified 
these categories of employees as peripatetic employees (for example, aircraft 
crew) whose base is in Great Britain,38 expatriate employees working for a 
British employer for the purposes of a business carried on in Great Britain,39 
and expatriate employees working for a British employer in a British enclave.40 
Subsequent cases (discussed below) built on this approach. Before these cases 
are considered, a number of other remarks made by the court in Serco, which 
are important for the present discussion, should be noted:
(i) the only question to be considered is the construction of the legislation 
at issue, which must be done according to the “established principles 
of construction, giving effect to what Parliament may reasonably be 
supposed to have intended and attributing to Parliament a rational 
scheme”;41
(ii) as mentioned, an interpretive approach pre-empts the private international 
law approach and determines jurisdiction;42
(iii) an interpretive approach also means that there is no room for the idea 
of forum non conveniens, because once legislation applies (where 
jurisdiction is statutorily circumscribed), there is only that one forum 
with jurisdiction;43
(iv) if the interpretive approach is followed to its logical conclusion, it means 
that “[t]here is no reason why all the various rights included in the 
1996 Act should have the same territorial scope … [b]ut uniformity of 
application would certainly be desirable in the interests of simplicity”.44
Duncombe v Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families45 
(“Duncombe”) dealt with dismissed English teachers who had worked for 
the Secretary of State in different countries. These teachers did not fit into 
the Serco categories, as they were employed in what may be regarded as an 
37 Serco Ltd v Lawson; Botham v Ministry of Defence; Crofts v Veta Ltd [2006] UKHL 3  For a full discussion 
of this case see Calitz (2011) Obiter 684-686




42 Paras 1, 38  
43 Para 24
44 Para 14  See the discussion by Grušić (2012) MLR 724-732 about possible approaches to different statutory 
rights
45 [2011] UKSC 36; [2011] 4 All ER 1020
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“international enclave”. In searching for a principle from the Serco decision, 
Lady Hale stated:
“It is therefore clear that the right will only exceptionally cover employees who are working or based 
abroad. The principle appears to be that the employment must have much stronger connections both 
with Great Britain and with British employment law than with any other system of law. There is 
no hard and fast rule and it is a mistake to try and torture the circumstances of one employment to 
make it fit one of the examples given, for they are merely examples of the application of the general 
principle.”46
In Duncombe, factors indicating a stronger connection were the fact that 
the employer was based in England, that the teachers were employed under 
contracts governed by English law and that the teachers were employed in 
an international enclave with no connection with the country in which they 
worked. The court found that these factors indicated an “overwhelmingly 
closer”47 connection with Britain than with the countries in which the 
dismissed teachers worked. Importantly, while still professing to interpret 
legislation, the court in Duncombe leaned in the direction of a private 
international law approach by taking connecting factors into consideration in 
endeavouring to establish the intention of the legislature.48
A similar approach was followed in Ravat v Halliburton49 (“Ravat”), 
apparently still under the guise that the court was interpreting legislation.50 
Mr Ravat, a British citizen and resident in Great Britain, commuted between 
England and Libya, where he worked for 28 consecutive days in Libya for a 
German company, followed by 28 consecutive days at home in England.51 
At the time of his dismissal Mr Ravat was working in Libya. The court 
recognised that the matter at hand did not fall into any of the “categories” of 
employees covered by either Serco or Duncombe, and declared the starting 
point for enquiries such as these to be as follows:
“The employment relationship must have a stronger connection with Great Britain than with the 
foreign country where the employee works.”52
However:
“[I]t does not follow that the connection that must be shown … must achieve the high standard that 
would enable one to say that [it] was exceptional … The question of law is whether section 94(1) 
applies to this particular employment. The question of fact is whether the connection between the 
circumstances of the employment and Great Britain and with British employment law was sufficiently 
strong to enable it to be said that it would be appropriate for the employee to have a claim for unfair 
dismissal in Great Britain.”53
46 Para 8  
47 Para 16
48 Grušić ((2012) MLR 727) sees this as a break from the pure interpretive (statutory) approach to also 
accommodate a choice of laws approach
49 [2012] UKSC 1
50 In para 28 the court mentioned that “the connection between Great Britain and the employment 
relationship is sufficiently strong to enable it to be presumed that, although they were working abroad, 
Parliament must have intended that section 94(1) should apply to them”  
51 He was not a peripatetic employee as he did to travel to different places in the world, but only to Libya  He 
could also not be classified as an expatriate as he did not live and work in a country outside of England
52 Para 27
53 Para 29
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Against this background, the court took several connecting factors into 
account. These included the fact that the employee lived in England, was 
recruited by a British firm (Halliburton) to work for one of its subsidiaries 
(a German company) in Libya, and that his dismissal was dealt with by the 
Human Resources Department of Halliburton in Aberdeen. The fact that 
the parties agreed that the English system would govern the employment 
relationship was another factor (although it was not regarded as conclusive).54 
In this case – where the employee’s home was in England – the court was of 
the view that the burden of showing a strong connection with Great Britain 
was less onerous than in the case of a person who both lived and worked in 
another country.55 The court was satisfied that these factors indicated that 
British employment law was the system with which Ravat’s employment had 
the closest connection,56 that consequently section 94(1) of the ERA applied 
to Mr Ravat’s employment, and that the Employment Tribunal (“ET”) had 
jurisdiction.
Also noteworthy is that the court addressed the impact of the fact that the 
employee worked for a German company in Libya and, in so doing, addressed 
one of the realities of international employment:
“The vehicles which a multinational corporation uses to conduct its business across international 
boundaries depend on a variety of factors which may deflect attention from the reality of the situation 
in which the employee finds himself. As Mr Christie said in the employment tribunal, it is notorious 
that the employees of one company within the group may waft to another without alteration to their 
essential function in pursuit of the common corporate purpose.”57
The development in Britain to protect employees working extraterritorially 
thus started off with a cautious approach by the House of Lords in terms of 
which only certain categories of employees were regarded as being included, 
and was further developed in Duncombe and Ravat to comprise the principle 
of a “stronger connection” with Great Britain.
In Clyde v Bates van Winkelhoff58 the Court of Appeal interpreted the 
approach in Ravat to entail that a comparative exercise identifying a stronger 
connection will only be appropriate if the employee works in one country 
outside England. A stronger connection with England will then have to be 
proved. However, if the employee works both in England and another country, 
there is no need for a comparative exercise and all that is needed to be proved 
is a strong connection with England.59
At this juncture it is necessary to pause and consider three points. First, 
Serco (and, by implication, its progeny) has been subjected to trenchant 
criticism as plainly incorrect.60 More importantly, what is clear about 
these developments is that both the interpretive approach and the private 




57 Para 30  
58 [2012] EWCA Civ 1207  
59 Paras 96-98
60 Grušić (2012) MLR 738-741, 747  
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under the guise of statutory interpretation (which, arguably, has been 
reduced to mere rhetoric in Duncombe and Ravat) the court will in effect 
determine the proper law (through a strong or stronger connection approach) 
to determine both jurisdiction and the application of legislation (as part of that 
proper law). So one cannot help but wonder whether continued debate about 
this matter is much ado about nothing. While the answer to the first of these 
questions in the UK context might seem to be “yes”, the apparent reason for 
this would be potential disharmony between the approach of domestic courts 
and the approach dictated by binding international (European) instruments.61 
But it is also arguable that there are other more fundamental reasons why 
clarity about, and the label of, the actual approach followed might still matter, 
reasons that will become apparent once the experiences of other jurisdictions 
are considered.
To complete the UK picture, we need to consider Simpson v Intralinks.62 
The claimant lived and worked in Germany; her contract of employment63 
contained an express choice of jurisdiction (Frankfurt) and choice of law 
(German), yet she brought action against her employer (with its registered 
office in London) under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and Equal Pay Act 
1970 in the Employment Tribunal in the UK, which declined jurisdiction. On 
appeal, the Employment Appeals Tribunal (“EAT”) held that
(i) Serco and it progeny, while instructive, were not applicable – section 
94(1) of the ERA was not in issue, while it cannot be said that a proper 
interpretation of article 6(2) of the Rome Convention depended on the 
close connection test of Serco, Duncombe and Ravat;64
(ii) the choice of jurisdiction was invalid as measured against the provisions 
of the Brussels I Regulation No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 (“Brussels 
I Regulation”);65
(iii) this meant, in terms of article 19 of the Brussels I Regulation, that the 
employer could be sued in the UK (and the ET had jurisdiction);66
(iv) proof of a contract of employment is a necessary step for a claim under 
the two pieces of legislation at issue and this meant the Rome Convention 
applied;67
61 Ie that the “stronger connection” approach in the UK – although similar – is not in line with the approach 
dictated by art 6 of the Rome Convention and art 8 of the Rome I Regulation
62 UKEAT/0593/11/RN
63 Entered into before the Rome I Regulation came into effect
64 Simpson v Intralinks UKEAT/0593/11/RN paras 41-42
65 Para 32  The Brussels I Regulation regulates jurisdiction in contractual disputes at EU level  Art 20 
provides for an agreement on jurisdiction “which is entered into after the dispute has arisen”, which was 
not the case here
66 Simpson v Intralinks UKEAT/0593/11/RN para 34  Art 19 of the Brussels 1 Regulation allows an employer 
to be sued in the courts of a member state where he is domiciled
67 Simpson v Intralinks UKEAT/0593/11/RN  In the words of the EAT (para 1):
“Section 6 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and Section 1 of the Equal Pay Act are both applicable 
only where there is either a contract of employment as such or a contract ‘personally to execute any 
work or labour’ ” (See s 82 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and s 1(6) of the Equal Pay Act 1970 ) 
See also para 54
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(v) the lex causae (proper law) of the contract was German law, as this was 
the choice of the parties (in terms of article 6 of the Rome Convention);68
(vi) although the employee had to prove the existence of a contract of 
employment in terms of German law, this did not preclude the application 
of the two pieces of UK legislation, because of their status as mandatory 
rules of law (in terms of their wording and article 7 of the Rome 
Convention);69
(vii) there is no territorial limitation in those two pieces of legislation to 
prevent their application in the present (international employment) 
dispute;70
(viii) this meant the matter was remitted to the Employment Tribunal on the 
basis that it has jurisdiction and has to apply German law (partly) to 
determine the existence of the contract (and possibly compensation) and 
UK legislation (partly) to determine discrimination and infringement of 
the Equal Pay Act to resolve the dispute.71
On the face of it, Simpson provides a clear break from the earlier 
interpretive approach in favour of a private international law approach in the 
broader EU framework. At the same time, proper consideration of the impact 
(and correctness) of Simpson requires consideration of a number of issues: 
first, the fact that there was a clear choice of law in Simpson; second, the 
significance of the Employment Appeal Tribunal’s finding that the existence 
of a contract is a prerequisite for application of the discrimination statutes in 
question with concomitant applicability of the Rome Convention (which is 
also the case with ERA, yet not dealt with in Serco, Duncombe and Ravat); 
and finally, that Simpson concerned discrimination law which, in the view of 
the court, is basically the same across the EU and, in the view of Grušić, is 
clearly mandatory. At the same time, the decision serves as reminder of the 
two different possible approaches yet still leaves the question: which one is 
preferable (not necessarily correct, but preferable)?72 It is submitted that the 
answer to this question is best considered with reference to the remaining 
jurisdictions – South Africa, New Zealand and the USA.
3 2  south africa
In Kleynhans v Parmalat73 (“Kleynhans”) and Parry v Astral Operations74 
(“Parry”) the South African Labour Court applied the rules of private 
international law75 to determine whether South African employees working in 
foreign countries would be protected by the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
(“LRA”). The Labour Court in these cases took all the connecting factors into 
68 Simpson v Intralinks UKEAT/0593/11/RN paras 45, 54
69 Paras 46-48, 54
70 Para 54
71 Para 56
72 In contexts other than the EU where the Rome Convention may be binding
73 2002 9 BLLR 879 (LC)
74 2005 26 ILJ 1479 (LC)
75 See a discussion of this approach of the Labour Court in K Calitz “Globalisation, the Development of 
Constitutionalism and the Individual Employee” (2007) PER 4 19
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consideration to establish which legal system would be applicable and in both 
cases found that South African law was the proper law, despite the workplace 
being in Mozambique (Kleynhans)76 and Malawi (Parry). This constituted 
a break with previous cases in which the workplace was regarded as the 
only factor determining jurisdiction as well as the applicable law in terms 
of an interpretive approach.77 However, in Astral Operations Ltd v Parry78 
(“Astral”) – a decision which currently provides binding precedent in the South 
African context and requires close consideration – the Labour Appeal Court 
reverted to the approach that was followed before the Kleynhans and Parry 
decisions. This approach entailed that in the absence of express provision for 
extraterritorial application, the Act was not applicable to workplaces outside 
South Africa.79 In this case, the employment contract was concluded in 
South Africa with a South African company in respect of a position termed 
General Manager: Africa Operations. The agreement contained no express 
choice of law and, at best, referred, where applicable, to “relevant legislation”. 
Services were provided in Malawi to a company registered in Malawi (albeit 
a subsidiary of the South African company). The Malawian company was 
sold, the employee repatriated to South Africa and, despite being informed 
that he will be retrenched (due to the closure of the Malawian business), 
remained in the employment of the South African company. The employee 
continued to render services to the South African company in respect of its 
African operations for a month or so after repatriation, at which time he was 
retrenched. The employee instituted four claims against the employer in the 
Labour Court, three of which are important for present purposes: first, a claim 
for contractual damages (based on unlawful termination); second, a claim for 
unpaid salary, notice pay, leave pay, relocation allowance and severance pay;80 
third, a statutory claim for the maximum allowable compensation for unfair 
retrenchment.81
The Labour Appeal Court held that the Labour Court did not have 
jurisdiction to hear these claims, apparently for the following two reasons:
(i) to the extent that the claimant relied on statutory rights, the approach 
laid down by the old Appellate Division in respect of the territoriality of 
application of the old Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956, namely that there 
76 EA Fredericks “The Proper Law of the International Contract of Employment: Interpreting the Kleinhans 
Decision” (2006) 18 SA Merc LJ 75 80 criticises this approach according to which the workplace was 
regarded as but one of several connecting factors and argues that the workplace should be held to be the 
most important connecting factor in order to ensure certainty  The authors will argue that a more flexible 
approach should be followed
77 Chemical and Industrial Workers v Sopelog 1993 14 ILJ 144 (LAC); Genrec Mei (Pty) Ltd v Industrial 
Council for the Iron, Steel, Engineering & Metallurgical Industry 1995 1 SA 563 (A)
78 2008 29 ILJ 2668 (LAC)
79 Para 19
80 Presumably in terms of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (and possibly contract)
81 In terms of the LRA
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is only jurisdiction if the “locality of the undertaking”82 fell within the 
borders of the Republic, should be followed (and that, in the case at hand, 
this test clearly indicated Malawi as the locality of the undertaking); and
(ii) to the extent that the claimant relied on contractual rights, the Labour 
Court only has jurisdiction in disputes arising from employment contracts 
by virtue of section 77(3) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 
of 1997 (“BCEA”)83 which means that if the Act does not apply (because 
of the “locality of the undertaking”), there can be no such jurisdiction to 
begin with.
What is clear from the judgment is that the court followed a similar approach 
to that of the Serco line of decisions, at least in the sense that the application 
of legislation was seen to be a matter of statutory interpretation to determine 
the extraterritorial application of legislation. At this point it already is easy 
to list the fundamental problems which exist with the Astral judgment. First, 
the current LRA contains no express wording about its possible territorial 
application, let alone wording similar to the wording (which included the word 
“undertaking”) contained in the old LRA. Second, the ratio for the decision 
in Genrec Mei (Pty) Ltd v Industrial Council for the Iron Steel, Engineering 
& Metallurgical Industry84 (“Genrec Mei”), the authority relied on by the 
court, primarily concerned the jurisdiction of industrial councils in terms of 
the old LRA, not the extraterritorial application of the Act itself. Third, to 
the extent that the court also relied on provisions in the LRA which limit the 
jurisdiction of the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
(“CCMA”) to the Republic, this seems mistaken. Any provision in the LRA to 
the effect that the CCMA has jurisdiction within the borders of the Republic 
(as a matter of geography) at best begs the question whether the CCMA has 
jurisdiction in international employment disputes and cannot be the answer to 
that question. In any event, the CCMA had no role to play in this case. Fourth, 
the rights contained in labour legislation (including the right not to be unfairly 
dismissed) acquires special importance via section 23(1) of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”), which extends 
as a fundamental right the right to fair labour practices to “everyone”. The 
judgment shows no appreciation of the absence of a constitutional dispensation 
when earlier judgments relied on as precedent were handed down, nor how 
laws (especially those giving effect to the Constitution) should be interpreted 
to promote the spirit of the Constitution. Not surprisingly – given the pre-
emptive effect of its interpretive ruling – the judgment shows no appreciation 
of the possible mandatory effect of labour legislation (especially in the light 
of the Constitution), the question relating to possible differential territorial 
82 This approach was followed in Genrec Mei (Pty) Ltd v Industrial Council for the Iron, Steel, Engineering 
& Metallurgical Industry 1995 1 SA 563 (A)  The locality of the undertaking was equated to the place 
where the employees worked, namely on an oil rig at sea  Even though the undertaking was established in 
South Africa, this was not a factor that could benefit employees due to the constrained interpretation of 
“locality of the undertaking”
83 This section gives concurrent jurisdiction to the civil courts and the Labour Court in respect of any matter 
that arises out of a contract of employment
84 1995 1 SA 563 (A)
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application of different legislative provisions, nor of the importance and 
possible impact of the interaction or otherwise between contractual rights 
and (possibly) free-standing legislative rights. On the upside, two remarks 
may be made. First, whatever its deficiencies, the judgment does provide a 
measure of certainty and guidance to lower courts and tribunals. Second, the 
judgment makes it clear that the enquiry into the locality of the undertaking 
is a question of fact, which would mean that at least some of the factors one 
would expect to be considered in any enquiry of this sort would and should be 
taken into account. Unfortunately, this does not help much if the focus of the 
enquiry remains inappropriate.
What is important is that the judgment shows the dangers of an interpretive 
approach to the application of legislation in international employment disputes 
where that legislation is silent on the issue. What will happen (as was the case 
in both the UK and in South Africa) is that courts will come up with tests 
and approaches under the guise of interpretation. Sometimes we can walk 
away (as is the case in the UK) and state that in their application and practical 
effect there is enough of an overlap between the private international law and 
interpretive approaches to provide some certainty and probably a fair result. 
Sometimes (as was the case in South Africa) one cannot help but feel that the 
(interpretive) approach followed is unjustified as such, deviates fundamentally 
and too much from the notion underlying the private international law approach 
(searching, as it does, for a “stronger” connection) and probably prevents a 
fair result because it prevents consideration of important factors. Although 
much is to be said for the certainty inherent in precedent, this simply cannot 
override the proper interpretation of legislation aimed at imposing fairness on 
the employment relationship.
The stifling effect of the test laid down in Astral is illustrated by the most 
recent reported instance of its application by the Labour Court in Global 
Outdoor Systems v Du Toit85 (“Global Outdoor Systems”). In Global Outdoor 
Systems the employee was a South African citizen who was approached 
by Global Outdoor Systems Ltd (“GOS Ltd”) in South Africa to work in 
Nigeria for GOS (Nigeria), a subsidiary of GOS Ltd. GOS Ltd was originally 
incorporated in the British Virgin Islands and its head office was located in 
Johannesburg, South Africa. Although negotiations with the employee took 
place in South Africa, the contract was signed at a later stage in Nigeria. The 
contract between the employee and GOS Ltd contained a choice of law and 
choice of jurisdiction – in favour of Mauritian law and the courts of Mauritius 
respectively (the reason being that the employer was in the process of 
relocating to Mauritius). However, at the time when the dispute was referred, 
GOS Ltd had not yet relocated to Mauritius. The employment contract 
stipulated that the employee had to report to both the managing director of 
GOS (Nigeria) and the international general manager of GOS (Ltd). After 
fourteen months of working in Nigeria the employee was dismissed after a 
85 2011 32 ILJ 1100 (LC)
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disciplinary hearing in Johannesburg, South Africa.86 He referred a dispute 
of unfair dismissal (in terms of the LRA) to the South African CCMA, which 
accepted jurisdiction. On review to the Labour Court it was held (without 
discussion) that the “locality of the undertaking” was Nigeria, that the LRA 
did not apply and, consequently, that the CCMA did not have jurisdiction.87 
Had this case been adjudicated on the basis of the private international law 
approach, the outcome would certainly have been that there was a sufficiently 
close connection with South Africa for the South African legal system to be 
applicable. Even on the interpretive approach of Serco, the employee could 
have been regarded as an expatriate with exceptionally strong ties to South 
Africa. Both these approaches would have resulted in an outcome that is more 
just towards the employee, who is the weaker party in the relationship.
3 3  new Zealand
Similar to the UK and South Africa, the New Zealand Employment 
Relations Act 2000 is silent as to whether it has extraterritorial application. 
The New Zealand experience shows a mix of the interpretive and contractual 
approaches by courts dealing with employment matters.
The Court of Appeal held in Jardine Risk Consultant v Beal88 that the 
contract between the parties would determine which legal system would be 
applicable. In this case an employee who initially worked for an employer in 
New Zealand was subsequently seconded to work for the same employer in 
the UK, where he was dismissed for misconduct. He initiated proceedings 
in the Employment Court in New Zealand, claiming that his dismissal 
was substantively and procedurally unfair and that New Zealand law was 
applicable.89 The question was whether UK law or New Zealand law was 
applicable. The Appeal Court found that New Zealand law would be applicable 
as an analysis of the facts indicated that (although the contract was varied 
to contain elements of British law) the parties did not expressly alter their 
original contract in terms of which the law of New Zealand would be the 
governing law.90
Another interesting example of a private international law approach where 
work was performed in New Zealand is Musashi Pty Ltd v Moore.91 In this 
case the employee was a resident in New Zealand, employed in New Zealand 
and had to perform his work in New Zealand. His contract was a standard form 
contract used irrespectively of whether employees were stationed in Australia 
or in New Zealand. The Employment Court stated that the proper law of a 
contract can be determined “first by express selection by the parties; second, 
by inferred selection from the circumstances; or, failing either of these, by 
86 This was a factor taken into account in Ravat v Halliburton [2012] UKSC 1 discussed above to indicate 
that the employment had a sufficiently close connection with the UK
87 The court did not deal with the choice of law (not necessary)
88 [2000] 1 ERNZ 405
89 Para 4
90 Para 21; C Bevernage “New Zealand” in W Keller & T Darby (eds) International Labor and Employment 
Laws II B 3 ed (2008) 71-1 71-13, 71-14
91 [2002] 1 ERNZ 203 (EC)  
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judicial determination of the system of law with which the transaction has the 
closest and most real connection”.92
As the contract contained certain references to the state of Victoria in 
Australia, the court held that the proper law of the contract was that of Victoria 
(inferred selection),93 but that New Zealand was the forum conveniens and 
that the dispute about unfair dismissal could be determined by the labour 
tribunal in New Zealand,94 applying Australian law. Some New Zealand 
tribunals have thus taken rules of private international law into consideration 
to establish whether New Zealand employment legislation will be applicable 
to employees working in foreign countries.95
An example of an interpretive approach is to be found in Mehta v Elliot 
(Labour Inspector)96 in which the court had to decide whether the Wages 
Protection Act 1983 (“WPA”) could have extraterritorial application. At issue 
was the prohibition on a demand for a premium from a prospective employee 
in return for an offer of employment.97 In this case the employer required 
a prospective employee in India to pay an amount as advance payment for 
an offer of employment in New Zealand. The court considered the general 
presumption against the extraterritorial application of statutes and stated that 
nothing in the WPA indicates that the legislature intended the Act to apply 
extraterritorially.98 In this regard, the court mentioned that in Britain this 
presumption has been watered down, but that a stricter approach has been 
followed in New Zealand and Australia.99 The court endeavoured to establish 
the legislature’s intention by referring to the history and context, as well as the 
legal, social and economic policy aspects of the legislation. The court found 
that at the time of the adoption of the Act there were certain malpractices in 
New Zealand which the legislation endeavoured to address in that employers 
circumvented minimum wage agreements by requiring employees to pay 
certain premiums back to the employer. The court stated that these reasons are 
not applicable to situations outside of New Zealand and that it was intended to 
prevent malpractices in New Zealand itself.100
Although this case does not concern a workplace outside New Zealand, 
it is significant that the judge endeavoured to establish the intention of the 
legislature by taking history, context, social and economic conditions into 
consideration. The court also examined international conventions to establish 
whether the legislation should have extraterritorial application, but found that 
92 Musashi Pty Ltd v Moore [2002] 1 ERNZ 203 (EC) para 38  
93 Paras 46-48
94 Para 56
95 J McKinnon “Dismissal Protections in a Global Market: Lessons to be Learned from Serco Ltd v Lawson” 
(2009) 38 Industrial LJ 101  
96 [2003] 1 ERNZ 451
97 S 12A of the WPA  
98 Mehta v Elliot [2003] 1 ERNZ 451 para 59  
99 Para 62  The court referred to Brannigan v Commonwealth of Australia (2000) 110 FCR 566 (FC) in which 
it was held that the Federal Court of Australia lacked jurisdiction to determine the matter at hand because 
the relevant Acts (the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, Sex Discrimination Act 1984 and the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1992) did not state expressly that they operated extraterritorially  
100 Mehta v Elliot [2003] 1 ERNZ 451 paras 53, 56-58
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the WPA was not adopted to give effect to international instruments, rather to 
address a specific domestic problem.101
Patullo and Myburgh102 are of the opinion that insofar as Judge Colgan did 
take the above factors into consideration, his interpretation was too restrictive 
and that he overemphasised the general presumption against extraterritoriality. 
The authors argue that by construing section 12A of the WPA as having no 
extraterritorial reach, the social policy underpinning the provision is wholly 
undermined in respect of vulnerable migrant workers relocating to New 
Zealand.
In the New Zealand context both the private international law approach and 
the interpretive approach have been subjected to criticism. McKinnon makes 
the point that private international law rules are complicated, may require the 
application of foreign law by non-experts (presiding in employment tribunals) 
which may (as was the case in Musashi) lead to incongruous results. In her 
view, the New Zealand Employment Relations Act 2000 should rather be 
amended to explicitly include certain categories of employees who perform 
their work outside New Zealand.103 As such, she is apparently also not in 
favour of an interpretive approach which endeavours to establish the intention 
of the legislature where that legislation remains silent.
Patullo and Myburgh have also suggested that legislation in New Zealand 
should be amended to expressly provide for extraterritorial application or not, 
so that there could be certainty. However, the authors warn that in adopting 
such an approach, “judicial caution is necessary to avoid asserting an exorbitant 
and stifling extraterritorial reach for local legislation”.104 Apparently this 
concern is based on the principle of comity in terms of which respect should 
be shown for the sovereignty of other countries.
3 4  The usa
The USA experience is interesting for a number of reasons. First, any 
discussion of the extraterritorial application of US federal labour legislation 
must start with a reminder that there is no general protection against 
unfair dismissal. Employees are employed “at-will”, which means that an 
employment relationship of indefinite duration can be terminated by the 
employer or employee for any reason, subject to certain limited exceptions.105 
This also means that consideration of the application of US labour legislation 
to international employment disputes has to focus on the experience in other 
101 Paras 56-58
102 L Patullo & P Myburgh “The Territorial Scope of New Zealand Employment Law: Quarter Acre or Global 
Village?” (2003) 9 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 281 285
103 McKinnon (2009) Industrial LJ 115-116
104 Pattullo & Myburgh (2003) New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 282-286  
105 There are some exceptions such as where the employee was dismissed in breach of contract, where the 
employer agreed that the contract would only be terminated for just cause and a fair procedure (Duldulao 
v Saint Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center 115 Ill 2d 482, 106 Ill Dec 8, 505 NE2d 314 [Ill 1987]); where 
there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Dare v Montana Petroleum Marketing 687 
P2d 1015 [Mont 1984] and Kerr v Gibson’s Products Co 733 P2d 1292 [Mont 1987]), and if the dismissal 
was in violation of public policy (Firestone Textile Co Division, Firestone Tire & Rubber Co v Meadows 
666 SW2d 730 (1983))
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areas covered by legislation, notably discrimination and collective bargaining 
rights contained in the National Labour Relations Act 1935 USC 151-169 
(“NLRA”). Second, as we shall see, the US experience provides examples of 
legislation expressly providing for extraterritorial application of legislation 
(in the sphere of discrimination) and of a different test (as opposed to a 
“connection” or “locality” test used in other jurisdictions) in the sphere of the 
National Labour Relations Act.
Anti-discrimination legislation protects employees in various ways, 
including protection against dismissal on the grounds of race, colour, religion, 
sex, national origin, pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions (Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964 § 42 USC), age (the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act 1967 § 29 USC 621 (“ADEA”)) and disability (the Americans 
with Disabilities Act 1990 § 42 USC (“ADA”)). These statutes each contain 
an express clause to the effect that they are extraterritorially applicable,106 
but only to American citizens employed by American companies or foreign 
entities controlled by US entities. To establish whether a company is controlled 
by another company, the “integrated employer test” will be applied.107 At the 
same time, all the anti-discrimination statutes contain a clause to the effect 
that an employer does not have to comply with these Acts, if compliance 
“would cause such employer or corporation employed by such employer to 
violate the laws of the country in which such workplace is situated”.108 The 
principle of comity is clearly respected in terms of this clause known as the 
“foreign law defence”.109
Due to increasing numbers of American citizens working for American 
employers abroad, there have also been calls for the extraterritorial extension of 
the National Labour Relations Act.110 This Act protects the right of employers 
and employees to organise and to bargain collectively, but is silent on whether 
it is applicable extraterritorially. In the light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
EEOC v Arabian American Oil Co111 (“Aramco”), courts are very conservative 
when it comes to applying labour legislation extraterritorially. This judgment 
established a strict test for extraterritoriality based on the point of departure 
that legislation is only meant to apply in the USA unless, through a process of 
106 ADESA 29 USC § 630(f)
107 The following factors will be taken into consideration:
 (i)  interrelation of operations between the foreign employer and a US company;
 (ii)   the extent of common management between the foreign employer and a US company;
 (iii)    the degree of centralised control of both companies’ labour operations; and
 (iv)     common ownership or financial control between the two companies
108 Age Discrimination in Employment Act 1967 § 29 USC s 623(f)(1); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964 
§ 42 USC s 2000e-1(b); ADA: Americans with Disabilities Act 1990 § 42 USC § 12112(c)  
109 For example, Kern v Dynalectron Corp District Court, ND Texas, Fort Worth Division 577 F Supp 1196 
(1983) concerned a matter where the employer required a helicopter pilot who was employed in Saudi-
Arabia to convert to Islam  The employee brought a claim against the employer based on discrimination 
on religious grounds  The District Court for Northern Texas accepted the employer’s “foreign law 
defence” since, in terms of the law of Saudi-Arabia, pilots who are not converted to Islam and who fly 
over Mecca would be beheaded  Conversion to Islam was seen by the court as a bona fide occupational 
requirement, one of the justification grounds for discrimination
110 29 USC §§151-169 (2006)
111 499 US 244 (1991)
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statutory construction, there is an “affirmative intention … clearly expressed” 
that legislation should apply extraterritorially.112
Against this background, two Circuit Court judgments have considered 
the extraterritorial application of the NLRA. In Asplundh Tree Expert Co 
v NLRB113 the third Circuit ruled that US employees who worked for a US 
firm and who performed temporary work in Canada were not covered by 
the NLRA. In this case a few employees jointly complained about working 
conditions and briefly withheld their work, upon which some of them were 
dismissed. The court held that as the act of dismissal took place outside the 
USA, the presumption against extraterritorial application (as per Aramco) 
must be adhered to. A different result was reached by the eleventh Circuit in 
Dowd v International Longshoremen’s Association.114 In this case members 
of an American trade union endeavoured to persuade Japanese dockworkers 
to refuse to unload fruit being exported from US harbours where a non-
unionised workforce was employed. In the USA this action would constitute 
a contravention of the NLRA, which prohibits secondary boycotts. The court 
applied the “effects” test: if extraterritorial conduct had an effect in the USA and 
if the conduct intended to have that effect, the conduct would not be regarded 
as extraterritorial.115 The court held that the NLRA did apply, as the conduct 
of the union leaders in Japan had an effect on employers in the USA – at least 
one vessel with cargo diverted to a US harbour with a unionised workforce.116 
In Timberlane Lumber Co v Bank of America117 – albeit in a different context – 
the effects test was slightly qualified by requiring that asserting international 
jurisdiction should hold up to standards of international comity, which may 
be addressed by requiring the effect to be substantial. There is currently no 
certainty about the extraterritorial application of the NLRA, nor about possible 
legislative extension of the NLRA to apply extraterritorially (with a foreign 
law defence) as in the case of anti-discriminations laws. It should, however, be 
borne in mind that at least one commentator has already described Congress 
as being “trigger happy” and infringing the sovereignty of foreign states by 
extending US anti-discrimination laws.118
4  Lessons to be learned
The comparative survey shows that the situation that most often confronts 
courts and tribunals in international employment disputes concerns the 
application of domestic labour legislation where that legislation is silent 
on its applicability in the international context. Against this background, 
the only broad guidance available to courts and tribunals typically is seen 
to be the universally accepted principles that there is a presumption against 
112 248
113 365 F3d 168, 170 (3d Cir 2004)
114 975 F2d 779, 788 (11th Cir 1992)
115 Hartford Fire Ins Co v California 509 US 764, 794-799 (1993)
116 Dowd v International Longshoremen’s Association 975 F2d 779 782 (11th Cir 1992)
117 549 F2d 597 (9th Cir 1976)
118 DG Barella “Checking the ‘Trigger-Happy’ Congress: The Extraterritorial Extension of Federal 
Employment Laws Requires Prudence” (1994) 69 Ind LJ Art 8  
INTERNATIONAL EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 557
       
extraterritorial application, and that there should be respect for the laws of 
other countries (the idea of comity of nations). Experience also shows that 
courts and tribunals accept this challenge as one of pre-emptive interpretation.
As much as one would like to argue that the private international law 
approach, which is in essence based on contract, should be followed and, 
perhaps, as much as this approach might be correct in the EU context, it 
is at least arguable that this approach will and should, at best, find limited 
application in other jurisdictions. For example, in the South African 
context it is fairly easy to argue that matters concerning basic conditions 
of employment are contractual by their very nature and that a private 
international law approach should dominate, despite the baseline provisions 
being contained in legislation (the Basic Conditions of Employment Act). 
This is so simply because, if contractual conditions are less beneficial than 
the Act, the Act expressly states that its provisions should be read into the 
contract, while if conditions are more beneficial, this will be the result of a 
contract. But protection against unfair dismissal (in terms of the LRA) and 
unfair discrimination (in terms of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998) 
are different matters entirely. Persons need to be employees to qualify for 
protection by legislation, but this does not expressly require a valid contract 
in the common law sense of the word. Put differently: while a contract of 
employment will make you an “employee” for purposes of legislation, the 
absence thereof does not necessarily disqualify you from protection. In South 
African labour legislation the focus is the employment relationship, not the 
contract of employment.119 Furthermore, there is strong authority (from our 
Supreme Court of Appeal) for the proposition that protection against unfair 
dismissal is not an implied term of the contract of employment.120 This does 
not mean the private international law approach is irrelevant (as to which, see 
below). It is simply difficult to see how this approach could be controlling 
in a world dominated by often free-standing legislative employment rights 
which find justification for their existence in the deficiencies of the contract 
of employment and are designed to impose fairness on an employment 
relationship (rather than contract) widely recognised to go beyond contract.
To the extent that the interpretive approach does (and, perhaps, should) 
dominate, experience shows that courts and tribunals have to be creative 
against the backdrop of the very broad (virtually non-existent) guidance 
provided by the two principles alluded to earlier (territoriality and comity of 
nations). Not surprisingly, experience shows mixed results – from a common 
sense and apparently fair result achieved in the British context, to the rather 
fickle, largely baseless and geography-inspired test formulated by the South 
African Labour Appeal Court. In the light of this, and also in the light of the 
fact that tribunals need clear guidance, a common theme in many jurisdictions 
is a call for legislative intervention, based on recognition that employment 
statutes should in limited and clearly circumscribed circumstances apply to 
119 See Kylie v CCMA 2010 7 BLLR 705 (LAC) and Discovery Health v CCMA 2008 7 BLLR 633 (LC)
120 SAMSA v McKenzie 2010 5 BLLR 488 (SCA)  
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international employment relationships – the more so where legislation may 
justly be described as mandatory.
But how should this be done? One example from the USA in the sphere 
of discrimination law is for the legislature to fashion a tailor-made scope of 
international application for the specific right in question. For example, in the 
South African context the definition of “employee” could – as in the USA – be 
amended to include “a South African citizen working for a South African 
company or a company interrelated to such a company in a foreign country”. 
But there are difficulties associated with this approach, both in the South 
African context121 and as a general matter of interpretation. Here we should 
remind ourselves of the experience in Britain in relation to the repealed section 
196(3) of the ERA (which until 1999 provided for international application of 
dismissal law in respect of employment outside Britain). This experience was 
described thus in Serco:
“The interpretation by the courts of what became section 196(3) had a somewhat chequered history 
and in Wilson v Maynard Shipbuilding Consultants AB [1978] ICR 376; 386 Megaw LJ said that the 
legislation (in ‘deceptively simple-looking words’: see p 384) had thrown up some problems which he 
did not think Parliament had foreseen. He invited Parliament, if it thought that courts were interpreting 
the section in a way which frustrated its intention, to reconsider the matter and amend it. Parliament’s 
imaginative response, twenty years later, was to leave the matter entirely to the judges.”122
The above word of caution is also applicable to the New Zealand experience, 
where the inconsistent approach of the courts has resulted in stringent 
criticism from authors who recommended that labour legislation be amended 
to explicitly state whether the specific Act applies extraterritorially or not.
One clue to a better solution comes from the EU experience of 
“international codification” and raises the possibility (in a non-EU context) 
of codifying the private international law approach. In the European context 
there are reservations about the hierarchical reliance on single and arguably 
inappropriate factors in the Rome Convention and Regulation.123 Perhaps 
the better solution lies in a compromise between the interpretive and private 
international law approaches as evidenced by the de facto result in Serco and 
its progeny. Where legislation becomes part of the employment contract, there 
is no reason why the private international law approach cannot be made part of 
that legislation by inclusion of a discretionary international application of that 
legislation coupled to a list of possibly connecting factors124 (not necessarily 
exhaustive and based on the standard contractual approach) to guide that 
discretion. And where labour legislation provides for free-standing rights, 
such a loosely bound discretion will not only work towards a fair result, but 
121 The South African Constitution (s 23(1)) extends the right to fair labour practices to “everyone” and does 
not limit it to “citizens” as certain other rights in the Constitution do  
122 Lawson v Serco [2006] UKHL 3; [2006] 1 All ER 823 para 8  
123 See the argument in part 3 1 1 above that the emphasis in the Rome Convention and Rome Regulation 1 on 
the place where the employee habitually works may be appropriate in a legal environment that is relatively 
harmonious such as the EU, but will be detrimental to an employee who habitually works in a developing 
country with less protective labour legislation than his country of origin
124 Factors such as applied by the Labour Court in Kleynhans v Parmalat 2002 9 BLLR 879 (LC); Parry 
v Astral Operations 2005 26 ILJ 1479 (LC); Duncombe v Secretary of State for Children, Schools and 
Families [2011] UKSC 36; [2011] 4 All ER 1020 and Ravat v Halliburton [2012] UKSC 1
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will militate against the introduction of tests as fickle as the “locality of the 
undertaking” which has taken hold in South Africa. Furthermore, while much 
is to be said for uniformity of application, there is the possibility of adapting 
this list of factors in the light of the status of the legislation in question. And 
there is no reason not to make the idea of respect for other countries’ laws 
part of the discretion. At the same time, it has to be conceded that this may 
not be possible in jurisdictions such as Britain, which labours under binding 
international instruments.
5  Recommendations and conclusion
An approach which creates a balance between a private international law 
and an interpretative approach, and between flexibility and certainty, could be 
ensured by listing certain connecting factors which a tribunal or court should 
take into account in deciding whether South African labour law applies to 
an international employment contract. Such a list could consist of the factors 
that courts took into account in the decisions discussed above. The list could 
be included in an amended Code of Good Practice: Who is an Employee?125 
which was issued in terms of section 200A(4) of the LRA and which deals 
with the question of who should be entitled to the protection of South African 
labour legislation. Section 203(2) of the LRA provides that NEDLAC may 
change any code of good practice, and section 203(4) provides that a person 
interpreting or applying the LRA must take into account any relevant code of 
good practice. Section 203 further provides that a Code of Good Practice may 
provide that the code must be taken into account in applying or interpreting 
any employment law. The advantage of including such a list in the Code is that 
no legislative process would be required.
Should the Labour Court or CCMA rule, in the light of the proposed list of 
connecting factors, that the LRA is applicable, this would mean that both the 
Labour Court and the CCMA, which are created by the LRA, could exercise 
jurisdiction. However, the court or CCMA will first have to establish whether 
the judgment will be effective before the court could assume jurisdiction.126
It should be made clear in the code that the fact that domestic legislation 
does not explicitly provide for extraterritorial application does not imply that 
the LRA and other employment legislation cannot under any circumstances 
be applicable. At most there could be a rebuttable presumption against 
extraterritorial application.
The code could make provision for considerations of comity. Should the 
application of South Africa’s labour laws have an impact on the country where 
the employee works (such as retrenchment of a large number of employees), 
this should be taken into consideration before the tribunal or court exercises 
its discretion to apply South African law. Guidance should also be given on 
what should be regarded as mandatory law.
125 N 1774 in GG 29445 of 01-12-2006
126 Calitz (2011) Obiter 678, 679-682
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The above recommendations establish a test based on the British approach, 
which is essentially a combination of the interpretive and private international 
law approach. This test should easily be digested by specialist tribunals. 
Grappling with guided discretions is what labour lawyers, arbitrators and 
judges do and do well. Labour law is based on fairness and fairness is ultimately 
a factual argument which cannot be predetermined and is best made within 
agreed parameters that often seem narrow, but are always surprisingly broad.
SUMMARY
An analysis of different methods of dealing with the application of domestic legislation in 
international employment disputes in the chosen jurisdictions indicates that two broad approaches are 
followed, namely a private international law approach and an interpretive approach. It is recommended 
that South Africa should follow a combination of these approaches, as is done in Britain, instead of the 
strict interpretive approach followed currently. This would entail that in deciding whether legislation is 
applicable, the court should take connecting factors into consideration. More specifically, it is further 
recommended that the definition of “employee” in the Code of Good Practice: Who is an Employee? 
be amended to provide guidelines to the Labour Court and the CCMA regarding connecting factors.
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